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Tribal Immunity from California’s Campaign
Contribution Disclosure Requirements
I. INTRODUCTION
Elections, on both a federal and state level, play a seminal role in
America’s representative system of government. Elected officials are
charged by their constituents with the responsibilities of identifying
and correcting perceived and apparent social, economic, and political
problems. Because of the powers vested in these representatives,
millions of dollars from candidates’ personal fortunes and from the
wallets of campaign supporters are invested each election.1
Native American tribes and their tribal gaming interests are
playing an increasing role in America’s political process. On both a
federal and state level, tribes and their affiliate gaming interests have
made large contributions to political candidates to influence the
debate on issues ranging from gambling licenses to tribal lands.2 As
with other campaign contributors, as the size of tribal contributions
increases, so too does the concern over the influence tribes may be
exerting on the electoral process.
This concern has reached a crescendo in California, which is
home to more Indians3 than any other state and more Indian tribes

1. For example, in the 2000 Presidential election, George W. Bush raised over
$193,000,000 and Al Gore raised over $132,000,000. See 2000 Presidential Race: Total
Raised and Spent, at http://www.opensecrets.org/2000elect/index/AllCands.htm (last
visited Mar. 29, 2004).
2. See Dwight Morris, The State of Campaign Finance: It Could Be Worse, WASH. POST,
Jan. 23, 1998, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/campaigns/money/
archive/money012398.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2004). For a specific example of tribal
involvement in federal elections, Indian tribes contributed over $1.5 million to Democratic
candidates and party committees during the 1996 election cycle. Id. Additionally, the Federal
Election Commission, which maintains records of all donations to federal candidates of $200
or more, reported that three tribes ranked in the top 500 soft money contributors in the 2000
election cycle. Brian Stockes, Tribes Chart New Course in Campaign Finance, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, Sept. 6, 2000, http://www.indiancountry.com/?672&style=printable (last
visited Mar. 9, 2004).
3. United States Census 2000, The American Indian and Alaska Native Population:
2000, http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kbr01-15.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
According to the census report, the United States is home to 4,119,301 individuals who are
either entirely or partially American Indian. Id. at 5. Of those, 627,562 live in California. Id.
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than any state other than Alaska.4 Over the last few years, tribal
contributions to candidates for California office have seen a dramatic
increase.5 Most recently, California tribes provided significant
contributions to two candidates in the recall election of California’s
governor.6 It is clear that California tribes will continue to make
large campaign contributions to candidates they support and thereby
have an impact on California’s electoral process.
It is unclear, however, whether tribes must make public
disclosure of those contributions. California, like many states, has
enacted campaign disclosure requirements to protect the integrity of
the state’s electoral process.7 In 1974, California adopted the
Political Reform Act of 1974 (the “PRA”) to ensure that “receipts
and expenditures in election campaigns [are] fully and truthfully
disclosed in order that the voters may be fully informed and
improper practices may be inhibited.”8 California’s legislation, passed
in the wake of Watergate when campaign finance reform became a
major issue, is typical of disclosure requirements and reflects the
political climate favoring disclosure. However, application of
California’s disclosure requirements to donations from federally
recognized Indian tribes was recently tested in two superior court
cases brought by the California Fair Political Practices Commission
(FPPC) against two Indian tribes for violation of the State’s

4. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 134 (July 12, 2002).
5. Max Vanzi, Tribes’ Political, Charitable Causes Get Casino Funds, L.A. TIMES, May
6, 1996, at A3. For example, tribal contributions to California Democratic candidates
increased from $33,000 in 1992–93 to more than $2.4 million in 1994–95. Id. While
California tribes have historically donated most of their money to Democratic candidates, the
tribes have made donations to Republican candidates as well. See id. As further evidence of
their involvement in California elections, tribes donated more than $741,000 in 1994 to a
single candidate running for Attorney General. Id.
6. Indian tribes across the State donated more than $3 million in support of
Democratic candidate Cruz Bustamante. An additional $100,000 of tribal money was donated
in support of Republican candidate Tom McClintock. The tribes also contributed $2 million
to an independent expenditure committee. See Don Thompson, Tribes Spreading Money
Beyond Bustamante to GOP Opponent, MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 18, 2003,
http://www.kansas.com/mld/mercurynews/news/local/6796522.htm (last visited Mar. 9,
2004).
7. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 81000–91015 (2003); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 150-9333j (2003); MINN. STAT. § 10A.20 (2003); WIS. STAT. § 11.12 (2003).
8. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 81002(a). The legislation requiring campaign disclosure is
known as the Political Reform Act of 1974.
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campaign disclosure requirements.9 In each case, the tribes filed
motions to quash service of summons and dismiss the suits on the
ground that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity from suit
relieves the tribes from compliance with the campaign disclosure
requirements.10
The superior court decisions delivered contradictory holdings on
the question of “whether a state court has the power to exercise
jurisdiction over a sovereign, federally recognized Indian tribe in an
action brought by a state agency seeking to enforce state law
concerning election campaign disclosures.”11 In Fair Political
Practices Commission v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, the
court concluded “that the tribe is not immune from . . . the PRA
reporting requirements for its political contributions and legislative
lobbying activities” because case law does not support the position
“that a tribe is immune from suit for activities that . . . are intended
to influence a sovereign State’s electoral and legislative processes.”12
Two months later, a different superior court in Fair Political
Practices Commission v. Santa Rosa Indian Community of the Santa
Rosa Rancheria granted the tribe’s motion to quash, finding that
case law supports a general tribal immunity “whenever Congress has
not expressly abrogated the immunity or the tribe has not expressly
waived its immunity from suit with respect to those activities.”13 The
California Supreme Court has ordered an appeals court to consider
whether Indian tribes must abide by the state campaign disclosure
requirements.14 But while this question is being addressed in

9. Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, No.
02AS04545, 2003 WL 733094 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2003), aff’d, Agua Caliente Band of
Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679 (Ct. App. 2004), available at 2004
WL 389462; Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Santa Rosa Indian Cmty. of the Santa Rosa
Rancheria, No. 02AS04544, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2003),
http://www.fppc.ca.gov/pdf/Santa%20Rosa%20Quash%20Ruling.pdf (last visited Mar. 11,
2004).
10. These doctrines will be developed in full infra Part II. Briefly, the doctrine of tribal
sovereignty suggests that registered tribes have governmental independence and are free from
state intrusion on this sovereignty. Tribal immunity from suit suggests that tribes are not
subject to suit in state courts unless the tribe or the federal government has waived this
immunity.
11. Agua Caliente, 2003 WL 733094, at *1.
12. Id. at *5.
13. Santa Rosa Cmty., No. 02AS04544, slip op. at 9.
14. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 2003
Cal. LEXIS 5367, at *1 (Cal. July 23, 2003). During the publication process of this
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California state court, the impact of the court’s ultimate decision is
not isolated to California’s campaign disclosure requirements.
Representatives from the election enforcement committees of several
states joined the FPPC in its argument, recognizing that the impact
of this question in California will likely impact similar questions in
their own states.15
This Comment argues that proper application of the United
States Supreme Court’s tribal immunity doctrine indicates that
registered tribes are immune from suit by state election officials
seeking to enforce campaign disclosure requirements unless or until
the federal government expressly removes the immunity or the tribes
expressly waive it. While states may have a substantial interest in
ensuring that their elections are free from the influence of
anonymous donors,16 that interest does not overcome the federally
recognized doctrine of tribal immunity that was recognized as
inherent in the tribes in early Supreme Court jurisprudence.17
Part II of this Comment introduces the doctrines of tribal
sovereignty and tribal immunity from suit, providing an explanation
of their origins and their current status. Part II also provides an
introduction to the PRA and its subsequent disclosure
requirements.18 Part III discusses the cases recently reviewed in
California superior court and their holdings. Part IV addresses the

Comment, the appellate court denied the Tribe’s petition by a 2–1 vote. The court ultimately
concluded that the doctrine of tribal immunity has no basis in the Constitution and is therefore
trumped by the rights of states to protect their republican form of government. Agua Caliente,
10 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 682. The dissent, however, concluded that the doctrine of tribal immunity
“is anchored in the United States Constitution.” Id. at 693. Consequently, the dissent argued
that the two competing constitutional provisions should be “harmonized so as to give effect to
both to the extent possible.” Id. at 694 (citing City and County of San Francisco v. County of
Mateo, 896 P.2d 181, 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)). Under this rationale, the dissent suggested
that a proper solution would recognize tribal immunity from the FPPC’s action because
protecting the doctrine in this situation would not destroy the State’s right to regulate its
electoral processes in light of “viable alternatives” available to the State. Id. The Tribe has yet
to decide whether to appeal this decision to the California Supreme Court. Steve Wiegand,
Court: No Tribal Immunity to FPPC, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 4, 2004, at A3.
15. Representatives from the election boards in Minnesota, Connecticut, and Wisconsin
filed declarations in the Agua Caliente case to oppose the Tribe’s motion to quash service. See
Opposition to Motion to Quash, at http://www.fppc.ca.gov/index.html?id=385 (last visited
Mar. 11, 2004).
16. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
17. A review of the Supreme Court’s tribal immunity jurisprudence is included infra
Part II.
18. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 81000–91015 (2003).
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question of whether a federally recognized Indian tribe is immune
from suits brought by state agencies to enforce campaign disclosure
requirements. Specifically, Part IV analyzes whether the lack of a
specific federal law providing immunity from suit to tribes for their
activities in state electoral processes forecloses the doctrine of tribal
immunity, and whether the Tenth Amendment and Guarantee
Clause serve as an explicit waiver by the federal government to tribal
immunity from suit for participation in state elections. While
concluding that tribal immunity precludes suit against tribes for their
failure to comply with disclosure requirements, Part IV also identifies
how the purposes of the disclosure requirements can still be met
while recognizing tribal immunity. Part V provides a brief
conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty
1. The development of tribal sovereignty
Traditional notions of tribal sovereignty in the United States date
to early decisions of the Supreme Court concerning whether tribes
possessed the ability to transfer title to property after the
establishment of authority and laws in the United States.19 In Johnson
v. McIntosh, Chief Justice Marshall noted that while the tribes
retained some rights to sovereignty after discovery, the establishment
of law and exercise of authority in the Americas led to a necessary
impairment of the historic tribal rights in land.20 Thus, while

19. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). Some scholarship also suggests that
the notion of tribal sovereignty predates even the Constitution. See, e.g., Robert Clinton, There
is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 118–48 (2002).
20. 21 U.S. at 574. Early treatment in the Court of the native tribes was based largely
on the European principle of discovery. This principle allowed the discoverer to “assert[] the
ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claim[] and exercise[], as a consequence of this
ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives.” Id. Chief
Justice Marshall concluded that while the tribes were the “rightful occupants of the soil . . .
their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished” by
discovery. Id. Thus, while Chief Justice Marshall recognized the tribes as sovereigns, they were
not recognized as “complete” sovereigns, suggesting that the tribes were ultimately subject to
the federal government. See also McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164,
173 (1973).
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Marshall characterized the tribes as sovereigns in Johnson v. McIntosh,
that characterization was left unclear by his suggestion that the
tribes’ sovereignty was incomplete.21
The Court added definition to its characterization of the tribes as
sovereigns ten years later in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,22 in which
the Court examined the “condition of the Indians in relation to the
United States.”23 In defining their relationship to the United States,
the tribes characterized themselves as foreign nations owing no
allegiance to the United States.24 The Court, however, rejected this
characterization for several reasons. First, because the tribes were
“within the jurisdictional limits of the United States,” the Court held
it would not be proper to characterize them as foreign.25 Second, the
treaties between the tribes and the United States placed the tribes
under the protection of the United States.26 Finally, the tribes
admitted that “the United States [has] the sole and exclusive right of
regulating the trade with them, and managing all their affairs as they
think proper.”27 Thus, instead of characterizing the tribes as foreign
nations, the Court instead characterized the tribes as “domestic
dependent nations.”28 This characterization enforced the notion of
tribes as “distinct political societ[ies], separated from others, capable
of managing [their] own affairs and governing [themselves],” while
still recognizing that the tribes were not nations independent from
the United States and its laws.29
In a further explanation of the relationship between the tribes
and the United States, Chief Justice Marshall noted in Worcester v.

21. See supra note 20.
22. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
23. Id. at 16. The Court characterized this relationship as “unlike that of any other two
people in existence” and as “marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no where
else.” Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 17.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. Marshall went on to explain that the characterization implied that the tribes
“occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will . . . . [T]hey are in a
state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”
Id. Though not explicitly defining the term “dependent,” Marshall gives the term meaning by
recognizing that “[t]hey look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its
power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great father.” Id.
29. Id.
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Georgia30 that the combined acts of the United States government
“consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities,
having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive,
and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is
not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.”31
This explanation expanded the notion of tribes as domestic
dependent nations by providing that tribes possess some level of
exclusive authority within their tribal boundaries.32
This recognition of exclusive authority included a separation
between tribes and the states. Marshall noted that “[t]he treaties and
laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territory as
completely separated from that of the states; and provide that all
intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the
government of the Union.”33 This separation of tribes from the
states was grounded largely in the language of Article I of the
Constitution, which gives Congress authority to “regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes.”34 The Court reasoned that this language
30. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1831).
31. Id. at 557 (emphasis added). Marshall reemphasized the Court’s recognition of
tribal authority in noting that “[t]he Indian nations had always been considered as distinct,
independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed
possessors of the soil.” Id. at 559. That he should use the characterization “independent” so
soon after his characterization of the tribes as “domestic dependent nations” in Cherokee Nation
suggests a further recognition of tribal sovereignty and a weakening of the term “dependent.”
32. It is important to recognize that this exclusive authority was only extended by the
Court to cover activities on territorial boundaries. The implicit corollary is that tribes do not
possess exclusive authority over tribal conduct occurring off territorial boundaries. This
distinction will be discussed infra note 59. It is also important to recognize that this exclusive
authority can be diminished by Congress under Article I of the Constitution. See infra note
34.
33. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Court compares the language in Article I with
the language of the Articles of Confederation, which suggested that states possessed some
authority to regulate tribal conduct. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 558. Under the Articles of
Confederation, Congress was given the authority to “regulat[e] the trade and manag[e] all the
affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the states.” Id. at 558–59. This authority,
however, was subject to the limitation “that the legislative power of any state within its own
limits be not infringed or violated.” Id. at 559. This caveat to Congress’s authority to regulate
tribal conduct provided the suggestion that the Articles of Confederation granted to states
some authority to regulate tribal conduct within state boundaries. The strength of this
suggestion, however, is unclear. In Federalist Paper 42, Madison questions the notion that the
Articles of Confederation granted to states the authority to regulate tribes. THE FEDERALIST
NO. 42. Madison noted that “how the trade with Indians, though not members of a State, yet
residing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external authority, without so
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“comprehend[s] all that is required for the regulation”35 of the
tribes, and therefore “[t]he whole intercourse between the United
States and [Indian tribes], is, by our constitution and laws, vested in
the government of the United States.”36 This separation of tribes
from the states was used by the Court to shield tribes from attempts
by state legislatures to regulate conduct within tribal boundaries.37
2. The modern doctrine of tribal sovereignty as it relates to nonmembers
on Indian land
Since Worcester, federal case law has chipped away at the notion
that tribal sovereign immunity serves as a complete prohibition to
the exercise of jurisdiction by states over tribes and conduct on tribal
land.38 In 1973, the Court recognized that “the doctrine [of tribal
sovereignty] has undergone considerable evolution in response to
changed circumstances.”39 The Court explained this evolution by
far intruding on the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible.” Id. Madison
continued by noting that this was “not the only case in which the articles of confederation . . .
inconsiderately endeavored to accomplish impossibilities; to reconcile a partial sovereignty in
the Union, with compleat sovereignty in the States.” Id.
35. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559.
36. Id. at 561. This does not suggest that states possess no ability to regulate tribes. For
example, states still possess the authority to regulate all intrastate commerce.
37. Worcester involved legislation passed in 1830 by the Georgia Legislature requiring
all white individuals living within the Cherokee nation to obtain a permit from the governor
and take an oath to support and defend the Georgia Constitution. Id. at 523. Mr. Worcester, a
white missionary from Vermont, was sentenced to four years in the state penitentiary for
violating this provision, and brought suit to challenge the validity of the state statute. Id. at
562. The Court ultimately concluded that the Georgia act was unconstitutional and that the
State had no authority to regulate conduct within tribal boundaries. Id. at 561 (“The
Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries
accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of
Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress.”).
38. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505
(1991) (states are free to collect taxes on sales to nonmembers); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713
(1983) (state can require traders who operate on reservations to obtain a state liquor license to
sell liquor for off-premises consumption); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (states may impose cigarette and sales taxes on onreservation purchases by nonmembers of the tribe); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (states can require Indian retailer on
reservations to add cigarette tax to non-Indian sales); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240
(1896) (state law may be used to try to punish crimes committed on an Indian reservation by
or against non-Indians); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882) (state law can be
applied to crimes committed by non-Indians against non-Indians on Indian land).
39. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973).
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suggesting that “notions of Indian sovereignty have been adjusted to
take account of the State’s legitimate [business] interests in
regulating the affairs of non-Indians.”40 This adjustment resulted in
the Court granting states some rights over the nonmembers on
Indian land so long as the state did not “infringe[] on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”41
Instead of treating tribal sovereignty as an absolute bar to state
jurisdiction over any conduct occurring on the reservation and any
conduct of Indians off the reservation, Justice Thurgood Marshall
noted that the “trend has been away from the idea of inherent
Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance
on federal preemption.”42 The trend towards preemption allowed the
doctrine of tribal sovereignty to remain a “relevant” doctrine so long
as it was used to “provide[] a backdrop against which the applicable
treaties and federal statutes must be read.”43 Preemption analysis,
however, meant that the doctrine was not relevant to provide
“definitive resolution” on questions of state jurisdiction.44 The
Court’s characterization of tribal sovereignty as merely a backdrop
against which treaties are considered has “alter[ed] the presumption
that the tribe has governmental power over all matters affecting the
tribe on the reservation, and that the state does not.”45
The doctrine of federal preemption, as currently recognized by
the Court, indicates that “State jurisdiction is preempted by the
operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal
and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the State interests

40. Id.; see also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin,
326 U.S. 496 (1946). By “non-Indians,” the Court was referring to changes in the doctrine of
tribal sovereignty that allowed state courts to hear both suits by Indians against non-Indians as
well as suits by non-Indians against non-Indians for crimes committed while on the
reservation. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
41. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172 (citing Williams, 358 U.S. at 219–20); see also
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
42. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172. Marshall evidenced this trend by noting that
“modern cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to
look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the limits of state power.” Id.
43. Id.; see also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980)
(noting that determination does not depend “on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state
or tribal sovereignty, but [calls] for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal,
and tribal interests at stake”).
44. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172.
45. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 75 (West 2d ed. 1988).
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at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of State authority.”46
Thus, under a preemption analysis, state law may preempt tribal
interest in self-government if the state can demonstrate that its
interest outweighs the tribe’s interest in self-government.47 Even
with respect to nonmembers on Indian land, this is not an easy
balancing test for states to win.48 The preemption analysis, then,
operates to provide states with jurisdiction over nonmembers on
Indian land only when the state can demonstrate a substantial
interest in regulating conduct on Indian land and only if that interest
outweighs the tribe’s interest in self-government.49
3. Determining when states are authorized to regulate tribes and tribal
members
The federal preemption analysis, which the Supreme Court has
used to determine those situations in which states are authorized to
regulate non-Indians on Indian land, has not been used to determine
when states are authorized to regulate tribes themselves and tribal

46. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983); see also
Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145; Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962).
47. See CANBY, supra note 45, at 76. Importantly, the Court noted in a footnote to
Mescalero that “[t]he exercise of state authority may also be barred by an independent barrier—
inherent tribal sovereignty—if it ‘unlawfully infringe[s] on the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them.’” New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462
U.S. 324, 334 n.16 (1983) (quoting Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142) (citation omitted). But
because tribal self-government is not generously defined “to include anything that affects
Indian interests . . . most cases involving the application of state law in Indian country are
decided on preemption grounds.” CANBY, supra note 45, at 76.
48. For an example of the difficulty states have in winning this balancing test, see New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983). In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache
Tribe, the State attempted to enforce its hunting and fishing regulations against non-Indians
who obtained permission to hunt and fish on the reservation. Id. at 329. The Supreme Court
upheld a decision by the Tenth Circuit that did not allow the State to preempt tribal
regulations governing hunting laws for non-Indians on the reservation. Id. at 330. The Court
noted that the “[d]evelopment of the reservation’s fish and wildlife resources has involved a
sustained, cooperative effort by the Tribe and the Federal Government.” Id. at 327–28. This
relationship with the federal government and the subsequent development of wildlife
resources, the Court reasoned, provided a significant benefit to the Tribe by providing the
resources needed to “maintain the Tribal government and provide services to Tribe members.”
Id. at 327. The Court ultimately concluded that granting jurisdiction to the State “would
effectively nullify the Tribe’s unquestioned authority to regulate the use of its resources . . . ,
interfere with the comprehensive tribal regulatory scheme, and threaten Congress’ firm
commitment to the encouragement of tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.” Id.
at 344.
49. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
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members. Indeed, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to
minimize tribal authority to regulate its own conduct and the
conduct of its members, particularly when that conduct occurs on
the tribe’s land.50
Unlike situations involving the state’s ability to regulate nonIndians on Indian land, the Court has not adopted a balancing test
to determine those situations in which states are empowered to
regulate tribes and tribal members. Instead, the Court reviews state
attempts to regulate tribal conduct under more traditional notions of
tribal sovereignty.51 With these traditional notions serving as the
measuring stick, those situations in which states have been granted
authority to regulate tribes themselves are rare, especially when states
are attempting to regulate tribes and their members on reservation
land. Indeed, the Court has stated that only under “exceptional
circumstances [may] a State . . . assert jurisdiction over the onreservation activities of tribal members.”52 And while noting that
exceptional circumstances exist in which states may regulate conduct
of tribes or tribal members on reservations, the Court has provided
no suggestion of the circumstances which would allow states to
satisfy this test.53
Thus, under the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, tribes and tribal
members enjoy a general immunity from state regulation for onreservation conduct, unless a state can satisfy the “exceptional
circumstances” test.54 For example, with respect to state attempts to

50. The Court characterized the instances in which it granted to states the authority to
regulate tribes in the absence of congressional authorization of such authority as “few.”
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 74 (1962).
51. See id. at 74–75.
52. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215 (1987)
(emphasis added) (citing New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 331–32
(1983)).
53. The Court in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe cites to Puyallup Tribe Inc. v.
Dept. of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165 (1977), as an example of an exceptional
circumstance in which a state was allowed to regulate the on-reservation activities of tribal
members. 462 U.S. at 331–32 & n.15. In Puyallup Tribe, the State of Washington was
allowed to regulate on-reservation fishing by tribal members. 433 U.S. at 165. The facts of this
case were deemed exceptional for two reasons. First, the land at issue, while located within the
reservation boundaries, did not belong to the Tribe. Id. at 175. Second, the Court held that
the State had an interest in conserving the wildlife, which had become a scare resource. Id. at
175–77.
54. Tribal immunity from regulation should not be confused with tribal immunity from
suit. Tribal immunity from suit will be discussed infra Part II.B.
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tax reservation land or Indian income generated from activities
carried on within the reservation, the Court has held that “Indian
tribes, like the Federal Government itself, are exempt from direct
state taxation and that this exemption is ‘lifted only when Congress
has made its intention to do so unmistakably clear.’”55 As a result,
tribes are immune from state attempts to regulate income from onreservation property or income-generating activities.56
While the Court has been unwilling to grant a general
presumption that all “on-reservation activities involving a resident
tribe are . . . beyond the reach of state law”57 the Court has
“consistently admonished that federal statutes and regulations must
be ‘construed generously in order to comport with . . . traditional
notions of [Indian] sovereignty and with the federal policy of
encouraging tribal independence.’”58 The Court, however, has been
more willing to grant to states the right to regulate the conduct of
tribes or their members when that conduct occurs off the
reservation.59 For example, the Court in Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones held that the State of New Mexico was authorized to impose a
tax on sales receipts the Tribe earned from its operation of a skiresort on off-reservation land leased from the federal government.60
In reaching its decision, the Court noted that “[a]bsent express
federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation
boundaries have generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory

55. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 183 n.14 (1989) (citing
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 765 (1985)); see also McClanahan v. State Tax
Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164 (1962).
56. Compare with Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Oklahoma, where the Supreme Court held that the Tax Commission was not entitled
to tax on-reservation sales of cigarettes to tribal members but was entitled to tax the onreservation sales to nonmembers. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
57. Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M., 458 U.S. 832, 845
(1982).
58. Id. at 846 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144
(1980)). The preemption analysis is essentially a fact-specific inquiry in which the Court weighs
the competing state interest against the tribe’s interests in self-government. While no
presumption exists in favor of the tribe’s interest in self-government, the Court’s language
suggests that the scales might be tipped initially in favor of the tribes, thus requiring the states
to demonstrate compelling reasons for tipping the scales in favor of state jurisdiction.
59. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) (“State authority
over Indians is yet more extensive over activities . . . not on any reservation.” (citing Organized
Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962))).
60. Id. at 155.
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state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State.”61 As a
result, traditional notions of tribal sovereignty as a bar to immunity
from state regulation have been weakened when the conduct at
question takes place off-reservation.
Supreme Court jurisprudence, then, suggests that for the PRA to
apply to California tribes, the court must determine whether the
tribal conduct (campaign donations) occurred on or off the
reservation. If the conduct occurred off-reservation, the state will
likely be required to demonstrate that the requirements are
applicable to all state citizens. If the conduct occurred onreservation, the state will likely be required to satisfy the “exceptional
circumstances” test.
B. Tribal Immunity from Suit
Even if a court were to determine under either a preemption
analysis or under the “exceptional circumstances” test that states are
authorized to regulate tribal conduct, states may still be helpless to
enforce their applicable regulations. Under the doctrine of tribal
immunity, tribes enjoy common law immunity from suit by states.62
This protection was recognized by the courts as a natural extension
of the powers vested in a sovereign and “necessary to protect nascent
tribal governments from encroachments by States.”63
Unlike immunity from regulation, tribal immunity from suit
extends to tribal activities taking place both on and off the
reservation.64 Additionally, the scope of conduct covered by the
immunity has been extended to areas not relating directly to tribal
61. Id. at 148–49; see also, e.g., Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game of Wash., 391 U.S.
392 (1968).
62. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998) (“[T]ribal
immunity is a matter of federal law and is not subject to diminution by the States.”); Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (“Indian tribes have long been recognized
as possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign
powers.”); Puyallup Tribe, 433 U.S. at 172 (“Absent an effective waiver or consent, it is settled
that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a recognized Indian tribe.”); United States
v. United States Fid. & Guar., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940) (“Indian Nations are exempt from
suit without congressional authorization.”); Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358
(1919) (“Without authorization from Congress, the Nation could not then have been sued in
any court; at least without its consent.”).
63. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758. While the doctrine is generally recognized as an outgrowth
of traditional notions of sovereignty, the Supreme Court recently stated that the “doctrine
developed almost by accident.” Id. at 756.
64. Puyallup Tribe, 433 U.S. at 168 (1977).
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self-government, such as off-reservation commercial conduct or
noncompliance with state and local laws.65
In fact, the Court recently recognized tribal immunity from suit
where state laws were validly imposed against tribes. In Kiowa Tribe
of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., Manufacturing
Technologies sought damages for the Tribe’s default on a contract
entered into off-reservation.66 Because the contract was entered into
outside the reservation, the Tribe was not immune from application
of the state contract laws under the canon of cases that provides for
the application of state substantive law to a tribe’s commercial
activities occurring off-reservation.67 But while the Tribe was subject
to the requirements of the state substantive law, the Court
recognized that the Tribe was immune from enforcement actions
under the doctrine of tribal immunity from suit.68 The Court held
that “[t]ribes enjoy immunity from suits on contracts, whether those
contracts involve governmental or commercial activities and whether
they were made on or off a reservation. Congress has not abrogated
this immunity, nor has petitioner waived it, so the immunity governs
this case.”69 Thus, while the Court has refused to extend tribal
immunity from regulation in many situations to tribal conduct
occurring off-reservation,70 tribal immunity from suit extends to
cover conduct occurring both on- and off-reservation.
Under the doctrine of tribal immunity, “a tribe is subject to suit
only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived
its immunity.”71 Thus, unless Congress has abrogated immunity, or
the tribe has waived it, the doctrine of tribal immunity prevents state
enforcement actions against tribes, even if the state is authorized to
65. See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 755; Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi
Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
66. 523 U.S. at 752.
67. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1973); Organized
Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962).
68. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 755 (“To say substantive state laws apply to off-reservation
conduct . . . is not to say that a tribe no longer enjoys immunity from suit. . . . There is a
difference between the right to demand compliance with state laws and the means available to
enforce them.” (citing Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 514)).
69. Id. at 760; see also Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 514 (holding that while the state had
authority to tax cigarette sales to nonmembers on the reservation, the tribe was immune from
suit by the state to collect unpaid taxes).
70. See supra notes 64–67.
71. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 751; see also Three Affiliated Tribes of Forth Berthold
Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986).
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regulate the tribe. Moreover, courts require that any tribal waiver be
explicit, and will not imply any waiver from a tribe’s conduct.72 For
example, the Supreme Court recently determined that a tribe that
filed a civil action had not waived its immunity from counterclaims
arising out of the same scenario.73
Similarly, congressional abrogation must also be explicit.74 In
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, a female member of the Santa Clara
Pueblo Tribe brought an action claiming that an ordinance denying
tribal membership to children of female members who do not marry
within the Tribe, while at the same time extending tribal
membership to children of male members who marry outside the
Tribe, violated the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1986 (ICRA).75
Martinez claimed that the ordinance violated a provision in the
ICRA which made it unlawful for tribes to “deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws.”76 The Tribe
asserted immunity from suit. Though the Court recognized that
Congress theoretically had the power to abrogate tribal immunity in
cases arising under the ICRA, because the Court found no explicit
language to that effect, it concluded that tribal immunity from suit
still existed in these cases.77
While a tribe’s ability to both file suit and rely on the doctrine of
immunity to protect itself against suits arising out of the same
scenario may seem inequitable, Congress and the courts have been
unwilling to provide many loopholes to the broad purview of tribal
immunity from suit. Though the Court has recognized “reasons to
doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine,” and has hinted that
it might “need to abrogate tribal immunity, at least as an overarching

72. See C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532
U.S. 411, 418 (2001) (“[T]o relinquish its immunity, a tribe’s waiver must be ‘clear.’”
(citations omitted)); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (holding that
sovereign immunity “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed”).
73. Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 509.
74. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (“This aspect of tribal
sovereignty [common-law immunity from suit] . . . is subject to the superior and plenary
control of Congress.”).
75. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2000).
76. Id. § 1302(8).
77. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 59 (“In the absence here of any unequivocal expression of
contrary legislative intent, we conclude that suits against the tribe under the ICRA are barred
by its sovereign immunity from suit.”).
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rule,”78 it has yet to provide any general exceptions to the traditional
understanding of tribal immunity from suit and has continued with
its general application of the doctrine.79 The Court has been
unwilling to base decisions on competing policy considerations,
preferring instead to leave that debate to Congress.80
Thus, even if tribal immunity from regulation does not shield
tribes from compliance with the requirements of the PRA, California
will be unable to enforce those requirements in state court unless
either the tribe or Congress has expressly abrogated tribal immunity
from suit in this situation.
C. The Political Reform Act of 1974
The Political Reform Act of 1974 was adopted to ensure that
public officials serve in an “impartial manner, free from bias caused
by their own financial interests or the financial interests of persons
who have supported them.”81 Because the legislature determined
that the then-existing disclosure requirements increased the influence
of large campaign contributors, new disclosure requirements were
adopted.82 The Act identifies the following as its purposes:
(a) Receipts and expenditures in election campaigns should be fully
and truthfully disclosed in order that the voters may be fully
informed and improper practices may be inhibited.
(b) The activities of lobbyists should be regulated and their finances
disclosed in order that improper influences will not be directed at
public officials.

78. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 759. The competing policy considerations the Court appears to be
contemplating are those of maintaining tribal independence and of protecting those who deal
with tribes. While Congress and the Court have granted tribes immunity from suit to protect
tribal rights of independence, the Court suggests that in an “interdependent and mobile
society . . . tribal immunity extends beyond what is needed to safeguard tribal selfgovernance.” Id. at 758.
81. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 81001(b) (2003).
82. Id. § 81001(d); see also Governor Gray Davis Comm. v. Am. Taxpayers Alliance,
125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534, 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“The manifest purpose of the financial
disclosure provisions of the Act is to insure a better informed electorate and to prevent
corruption of the political process.”).
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(c) Assets and income of public officials which may be materially
affected by their official actions should be disclosed . . . .83

The Act is essentially a reporting act, requiring both candidates
and contributors to report contributions made and received. With
respect to contributors, the Act requires that “committees” make
84
disclosures of their campaign contributions. Committees are
defined by statute as “any person or combination of persons who
directly . . . makes contributions totaling ten thousand dollars
($10,000) or more in a calendar year to or at the behest of
candidates or committees.”85 Each committee is required
semiannually to submit reports called campaign statements if they
have made contributions or independent expenditures during the
six-month period before the date on which the report must be
filed.86
On the campaign statement, committees are required to disclose
every contribution or independent expenditure made during the
period equaling one hundred dollars ($100) or more.87 This report
must provide the name of the candidate, the candidate’s address, the
amount of the contribution, the date on which the contribution was
provided, the cumulative amount of contributions made to the

83. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 81002(a)–(c). This section explicitly identifies four additional
purposes that are not relevant to the scope of this Comment.
84. Id. § 84211.
85. Id. § 82013(c). The Act defines the term “person” to include any “individual,
proprietorship, firm, partnership, joint venture, syndicate, business trust, company,
corporation, limited liability company, association, committee, and any other organization or
group of persons acting in concert.” Id. § 82047. The term does not specifically mention
Indian tribes or any other distinct political entities. If an Indian tribe were to fit within this
definition, it would likely do so as an organization or group acting in concert. The FPPC
asserted in its complaint that tribes satisfy the Act’s definition of person. Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint ¶ 9, Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla
Indians, 2003 WL 733094 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2003) (No. 02AS04545), at
http://www.fppc.ca.gov/pdf/acl/AguaCalSAC2.pdf. The issue of whether tribes fit within
this definition, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment, which focuses on the first
question that would arise in similar cases, i.e., whether the doctrine of tribal immunity prevents
the state from enforcing such legislation in a lawsuit.
86. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84200(a)–(b). The terms “contributions” and “independent
expenditures” are defined terms within the Act. See id. §§ 82015, 82031. The question of
whether the contributions made in these cases satisfy either of these definitions is a question of
fact which is not essential to the thesis of this Comment.
87. Id. § 84211(k).
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candidate, and the office and district for which the candidate seeks
nomination or election.88
The Act also imposes reporting requirements for lobbying
expenses. Any person who makes direct or indirect payments of
$5,000 or more in a calendar quarter “to influence legislative or
administrative action” must file periodic reports.89 This report must
contain the name of the lobbyist employed by the filer, the total
amount paid to each lobbying firm, the total amount of all payments
to lobbyists employed by the filer, and a description of the specific
lobbying interests of the filer.90
Regulation of the Act falls to the FPPC, which has “primary
responsibility for the impartial, effective administration and
implementation of this title.”91 The FPPC’s broad mandate includes
the power to investigate possible violations of the Act and to hold
hearings to determine if violations have occurred.92 It is under this
authority that the Agua Caliente and Santa Rosa Community cases
arose.
III. CALIFORNIA CASES TESTING THE APPLICABILITY OF TRIBAL
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT UNDER THE PRA
A. Fair Political Practices Commission v. Agua Caliente Band of
Cahuilla Indians93
1. The facts
In October of 2002, the FPPC brought suit against the Agua
Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians (hereinafter “Agua Caliente”)94
for violation of the Political Reform Act’s campaign disclosure and
88. Id. § 84211(k)(1)–(5).
89. Id. § 86115(b).
90. Id. § 86116(a)–(d).
91. Id. § 83111.
92. Id. §§ 83115, 83116.
93. No. 02AS04545, 2003 WL 733094 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2003), aff’d, Agua
Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679 (Ct. App. 2004),
available at 2004 WL 389462.
94. The Agua Caliente Tribe resides on approximately 30,000 acres in the Palm Springs
area. The bylaws and constitution of the Tribe were adopted in 1952 and approved by the
Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, in the same year. See Political History, at
http:/www.aguacaliente.org/political.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
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lobbying disclosure requirements. The FPPC claimed that the Tribe
made sizable contributions in 1998, 2001, and 2002 without
disclosing the contributions.95 The size of the contributions qualified
the Tribe as a major donor committee required to file semiannual
reports detailing all political contributions.96 The Tribe, however,
filed no reports with the FPPC and furthermore, according to the
FPPC, did not report funds paid to a lobbying firm contracted to
influence legislative actions.97 Representatives from the election
enforcement committees of several states joined with the FPPC in
arguing that states possess the ability to both regulate and enforce
campaign disclosure requirements on tribes living within the state’s
jurisdiction.98
The Tribe responded by bringing a motion to quash service of
summons on the grounds that the court lacked personal jurisdiction
as a result of tribal immunity.99 The ensuing lawsuit tested “whether
a state court has the power to exercise jurisdiction over a sovereign,
federally recognized Indian tribe in an action brought by a state
agency seeking to enforce state law concerning election campaign
disclosures.”100

95. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 10–14, Agua Caliente (No.
02AS04545), at http://www.fppc.ca.gov/pdf/acl/AguaCalSAC2.pdf (last visited May 26,
2004). The FPPC alleged that the Tribe made contributions totaling at least $7,510,177 in
1998, $175,250 in 2001, and another $426,000 in 2002. Id. ¶¶ 11–13. The FPPC asserts
that these contributions went to support statewide ballot initiatives as well as more than 140
candidates for state offices, such as Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General. Id.
The suit was brought before the recall election in 2003; thus, any funds donated to candidates
in that election were not part of this suit.
96. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82013.
97. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 14, 17–22, Agua Caliente (No.
02AS04545), at http://www.fppc.ca.gov/pdf/acl/AguaCalSAC2.pdf.
98. Representatives from Connecticut, Minnesota, and Wisconsin filed declarations
opposing the Tribe’s motion to quash. See Opposition to Motion to Quash, at
http://www.fppc.ca.gov/index.html?id=385 (last visited Mar. 11, 2004). The declarations
filed by these representatives serve as an indication of the importance of these cases. A
recognition by California courts that tribal contributions are not subject to regulation by the
State or that tribes are immune from enforcement of such statutes has the potential to impact
court decisions in nearly every state.
99. Agua Caliente, 2003 WL 733094, at *1.
100. Id.
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2. The case in support of removing tribal immunity from suit under the
PRA
The superior court ultimately concluded that the doctrine of
tribal immunity does not shield tribes from suits for failure to
disclose campaign contributions under the PRA.101 Accordingly, the
court determined that it had the power to determine whether the
Tribe was in violation of the Act.
In reaching its conclusion, the court recognized that neither the
Tribe nor Congress had expressly abrogated immunity in this
situation.102 Indeed, the court reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s
explicit statement that “an effective waiver of tribal immunity from
suit must be clearly and unequivocally expressed.”103 The court relied
on this rule to conclude that the Tribe’s voluntary participation in
the state’s political contests did not serve as an effective waiver of
tribal immunity from suit.104 The court also rejected the FPPC’s
contention that tribal immunity from suit has been absolved in any
situation in which a state seeks to regulate its political processes.105
But while the court recognized the Supreme Court’s holdings
allowing immunity to be abrogated only upon express waiver, and
after finding that the Tribe provided no express waiver, the court
nevertheless concluded that Agua Caliente was “not immune from
the FPPC’s action to enforce the PRA reporting requirements for its
political contributions and legislative lobbying activities.”106 Relying
on the implications in Kiowa that the doctrine should not exist as a
general rule,107 the court determined that the rule should not apply
in this situation because “[n]o case has held that a tribe is immune
from suit for activities that, instead of promoting tribal selfgovernance and development, are intended to influence a sovereign

101. Id. at *5.
102. Id.
103. Id. at *4 (citing C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 423 (2001)).
104. Id. (“Thus, the Tribe’s contributions to political campaigns and employment of
legislative lobbyists made outside the statutory framework of the PRA, though quite extensive,
are insufficient by themselves to effectively waive the Tribe’s immunity from the FPPC’s
enforcement action.”).
105. Id.
106. Id. at *5.
107. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.
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State’s electoral and legislative processes.”108 The court noted further
that “[no] case suggest[s] that the federal common law of tribal
immunity was meant to apply to a suit by the State to enforce its
laws regulating all persons who seek to influence the State’s political
processes.”109 Based on these perceived gaps in Supreme Court
jurisprudence, the court chose to identify conduct affecting a
sovereign state’s electoral processes as a situation in which the
doctrine of immunity from suit does not exist.
The court supported its conclusion on two grounds. First, the
court cited the Supreme Court’s holding in Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones that off-reservation Indians are, like other citizens, subject to all
nondiscriminatory laws of the states.110 Under this doctrine the court
reasoned that the Tribe would be subject to the nondiscriminatory
PRA because the impact of the regulation reached beyond the
reservation and did not relate specifically to tribal self-government.111
Second, the court concluded that tribal immunity from suit in
this situation would violate rights reserved to the State by the
Constitution. Specifically, the court found that recognizing tribal
immunity in this situation would “intrude upon the State’s exercise
of its reserved power under the Tenth Amendment to regulate its
electoral and legislative processes and would interfere with the
republican form of government guaranteed to the State.”112 The
court contended that among the powers reserved to states under the
Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause was that of controlling
the influence of wealthy interests in state elections.113 This reasoning
was supported by reference to Buckley v. Valeo,114 in which the
Supreme Court upheld federal campaign disclosure laws as an
important tool in protecting the political process. The court applied

108. Agua Caliente, 2003 WL 733094, at *5. The court attempts to distinguish this case
from other cases in which the Supreme Court refused to abrogate tribal immunity by noting
that “[p]ertinent decisions recognizing the doctrine have concerned activities affecting tribal
self-governance and economic development, not activities affecting the governance and
development of another sovereign.” Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1973)).
111. Id. at *5–6.
112. Id. at *6.
113. Id.
114. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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the same reasoning to the PRA and concluded that the Act “must
apply equally to all with no exceptions.”115
Based on this reasoning, the court held that it was “empowered
to exercise jurisdiction over the Tribe to decide the important issues
raised in this case.”116 In July of 2003, however, the California
Supreme Court ordered an appeals court to reconsider the issue of
whether tribes are protected by common law immunity.117
B. Fair Political Process Comm’n v. Santa Rosa Community of the
Santa Rosa Rancheria118
1. The facts
The FPPC also brought a claim in October 2002 against the
Santa Rosa Community of the Santa Rosa Rancheria Tribe
(hereinafter “Santa Rosa”)119 for violations of the PRA. The claim
alleged that the Tribe contributed at least $125,000 in 1998 and
$35,000 in 2000 to California political candidates and
committees.120 As in Agua Caliente, the FPPC argued that the size
of the contribution qualified Santa Rosa as a committee under the
PRA and subjected the Tribe to semiannual reporting
requirements.121
Santa Rosa filed a motion to quash “on the ground that [the]
court lacks jurisdiction over the Tribe pursuant to the federal
common law of tribal immunity from suit.”122 The Tribe’s motion
was heard by the superior court in early 2003.
115. Agua Caliente, 2003 WL 733094, at *7.
116. Id.
117. See supra note 14; see also Don Thompson, California Rulings Cut Both Ways in
Tribal Election Law Cases, S.F. CHRON., July 23, 2003, http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/news/archive/2003/07/23/state2055EDT0220.DTL.
118. No. 02AS04544, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2003), http://www.fppc.ca.gov/
pdf/Santa%20Rosa%20Quash%20Ruling.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
119. The Santa Rosa Tribe’s boundaries encompass approximately 170 acres in the San
Joaquin Valley. The Tribe was established in 1934 and has over 200 members. See The Tachi
Yokut Tribe: The Santa Rosa Rancheria, http://www.tachi-yokut.com/rancheria.html (last
visited Mar. 11, 2004).
120. First Amended Complaint of the FPPC ¶¶ 9–10, Santa Rosa Cmty. (No.
02AS04544), at http://www.fppc.ca.gov/pdf/SantaRosaFAC.pdf (last visited May 26,
2004).
121. Id. ¶¶ 13–23.
122. Santa Rosa Cmty., No. 02AS04544, slip op. at 2.
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2. The case against removing tribal immunity under the PRA
In March of 2003, a superior court judge ruled that, in contrast
with the ruling in Agua Caliente, the Santa Rosa Tribe was immune
from any suit brought under the Political Reform Act.123 Instead of
focusing on whether the State’s interest in protecting its political
processes outweighs the Tribe’s interest in tribal immunity from suit,
the court focused exclusively on the doctrine of waiver. Like the
court in Agua Caliente, the court refused to recognize the Tribe’s
participation in the State’s political processes as an express waiver of
tribal immunity.124
With respect to congressional waiver, the court reaffirmed the
Supreme Court’s position in Kiowa that any congressional waiver
must be explicit.125 As a corollary, the court reasoned,
[C]ongressional silence regarding the immunity of Indian tribes
from suits to enforce state law requirements for electoral campaign
contributions
cannot
be
construed
as
congressional
acknowledgment of the States’ right to bring such suits against the
tribes in the exercise of the States’ powers under the Tenth
Amendment and the Guaranty [sic] Clause of the United States
Constitution.126

The court concluded that tribal immunity from suit is available
to tribes even in situations in which rights granted to a state might
be minimized, unless Congress expressly abrogates the immunity.127
According to the court, “Congress . . . may exercise its plenary
power over Indian affairs to approve, either by express enactment or
by silence, common law tribal immunity from suits by the States . . .
even though the immunity may hamper the States’ exercise of its
reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment.”128
123. Id. at 12.
124. Id. at 11.
125. Id. at 9.
126. Id. at 9–10.
127. Id. at 10 (“Congress does not impermissibly intrude upon the States’ reserved
powers under the Tenth Amendment and Guaranty [sic] Clause when, by silence, it permits
the doctrine of common law tribal immunity from suit to bar suits by the States to enforce
against tribes state reporting requirements for electoral campaign contributions.”).
128. Id. at 10–11 (footnote omitted). The court’s conclusion is based primarily in the
Constitution:
Congress has plenary power to control and define the sovereign activities and
interests of Indian tribes under article 1, section 8, clause 3, of the United States
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In reaching its conclusion, the court was “not unmindful” of the
State’s interest in protecting its political processes.129 Rather, the
court recognized that California has a fundamental interest in
protecting the State’s political processes and that the PRA serves as
an effective means of protecting those interests.130 In spite of these
concessions, however, the court concluded that it must recognize
the immunity from suit traditionally granted to tribes.
IV. A STATE’S INTEREST IN ITS ELECTORAL PROCESSES IS
INSUFFICIENT TO ABROGATE TRIBAL IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
The court in Santa Rosa reached the correct result. Tribal
immunity protects tribes from suit under the Political Reform Act.
Agua Caliente incorrectly focused on a preemption analysis, which is
appropriate only when deciding whether a state is authorized to
regulate individual activity, and not when deciding whether a state
has the right to enforce a regulation against a tribe or its members.
Further, the Tenth Amendment and Guarantee Clause of the United
States Constitution do not act as an explicit waiver of tribal
immunity and, therefore, are not grounds for abrogating immunity.
Finally, recognizing tribal immunity from suit does not lead to an
undesirable result because recipients of campaign donations must
also file disclosure statements that identify donors, including tribal
donors.
A. The Court Reached the Wrong Conclusion in Agua Caliente by
Incorrectly Relying on a Preemption Analysis to Abrogate Tribal
Immunity from Suit
The court in Agua Caliente concluded that tribal immunity did
not protect the Tribe from suit under the Political Reform Act
because no case has applied the doctrine of tribal immunity to
instances in which tribal conduct is designed to influence a state’s
political processes rather than promoting self-government.131 This
Constitution. . . . As a result, the States have jurisdiction over tribal activities only as
permitted by federal law even when the tribal activities affect state sovereign powers,
rights, and interests.
Id. at 10 (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 12.
130. Id.
131. Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, No.
02AS04545, 2003 WL 733094, at *5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2003), aff’d, Agua Caliente
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reasoning suggests a balancing of interests by the court and a belief
that states may properly regulate tribes when tribes are acting to
influence a sovereign’s political processes. While this assertion may
be correct, it incorrectly focuses the question on regulation rather
than enforcement.
The test for determining when states are authorized to regulate
tribal conduct on Indian land132 is different from the test used to
determine when tribal immunity from suit may be abrogated to
allow states to enforce their regulations in state court.133 In
determining those situations in which states are authorized to
regulate tribal conduct on Indian land, the Supreme Court has
recognized that tribal sovereignty must “take account of the State’s
legitimate interests in regulating the affairs of non-Indians.”134
Courts, therefore, engage in balancing the competing interests of
tribes in promoting self-government against state interests in
regulating conduct within its borders to determine those situations
in which states are entitled to regulate non-Indians on reservations.
This balancing of interests, however, does not answer the question of
whether tribes are immune from suit.
Rather than addressing the question of whether the state has
authority to enforce tribal violations of the PRA, the court in Agua
Caliente focused on the issue of whether the state has authority to
regulate tribal campaign contributions.135 Under the Supreme

Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679 (Ct. App. 2004), available
at 2004 WL 389462.
132. See supra notes 50–61 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 62–80 and accompanying text.
134. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973); see also
supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
135. The distinction between the authority to regulate and the ability to enforce
regulations through a lawsuit is not merely a distinction without a difference. In Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, the Supreme Court concluded that
Oklahoma was authorized to tax cigarette sales by the Tribe to nonmembers. 498 U.S. 505,
513 (1991). However, in addition to deciding that the State was authorized to regulate these
cigarette sales, the Court also concluded that tribal immunity from suit prevented the state
from bringing enforcement actions in court to collect the taxes. Id. at 509–11. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court admits that “[t]here is no doubt that sovereign immunity bars the State
from pursuing the most efficient remedy.” Id. at 514. The Court suggests, however, that the
State is not without a remedy. The State could, for example, “collect the sales tax from
cigarette wholesalers, either by seizing unstamped cigarettes off the reservation, or by assessing
wholesalers who supplied unstamped cigarettes to the tribal stores.” Id. (citations omitted).
For further examples of the distinction between regulation and enforcement, see Washington v.
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Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo, which concluded that states
have a significant interest in protecting their political processes and
ensuring that wealthy contributions do not influence political
candidates, it is possible that California has authority to regulate
tribal contributions from tribes intended to influence the state’s
political processes.136
But no matter how large the state interest, the question of tribal
immunity has traditionally been one of waiver.137 While the court in
Agua Caliente was correct that “[n]o case has held that a tribe is
immune from suit for activities that, instead of promoting tribal selfgovernance and development, are intended to influence a sovereign
State’s electoral and legislative processes,”138 it is also correct that no
court case (prior to Agua Caliente) has abrogated tribal immunity
on the basis that a state has a significant interest in enforcing its
regulations. Rather, as the court in Santa Rosa correctly noted, “the
issue is resolved by federal case law recognizing tribal immunity from
suits arising from particular tribal activities whenever Congress has
not expressly abrogated the immunity or the tribe has not expressly
waived its immunity from suit with respect to those activities.”139
Tribal immunity cannot be abrogated by invoking a compelling
governmental interest; it can only be abrogated by express

Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), and Moe v. Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
136. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). While Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411
U.S. 145 (1973), suggests that the question of whether tribes themselves may be regulated
depends on whether the activity occurred within or without Indian country, the fact that tribal
conduct may have an impact beyond the reservation does not necessarily mean that the state
can regulate it if the conduct actually occurred on the reservation. Thus, the question of
whether California has the authority to regulate a tribe depends largely on where the tribe’s
conduct occurred, not on the place of its impact.
137. See Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Santa Rosa Cmty., No. 02AS04544, slip op.
at 9 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2003), http://www.fppc.ca.gov/pdf/Santa%20Rosa%20
Quash%20Ruling.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2004). (“Were the preemption analysis to result in
a determination authorizing state regulation of tribal contributions, the determination would
not resolve the critical issue here: whether a state suit against a tribe to enforce a state electoral
campaign regulations [sic], even if validly imposed upon the tribe, would be barred by the
federal common law doctrine of tribal immunity.”).
138. Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, No.
02AS04545, 2003 WL 733094, at *5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2003), aff’d, Agua Caliente
Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679 (Ct. App. 2004), available
at 2004 WL 389462.
139. Santa Rosa Cmty., No. 02AS04544, slip op. at 9.
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congressional actions or waived by express tribal actions.140 While
requiring express waiver may serve as an “unjustifiable impediment[]
to the State’s achievement of its sovereign interest in the integrity of
its electoral processes . . . [,] [a]ny perceived inequity resulting from
the application of tribal immunity to bar this action must be
accepted.”141 The Supreme Court has been unwilling to provide
exceptions to its waiver requirements, choosing instead to leave
competing policy concerns in the hands of Congress.142 Until
Congress chooses to abrogate this immunity or until tribes provide
express waiver of their immunity, courts should not engage in a
balancing of competing interests to determine when tribal immunity
from suit may be abrogated.
B. Neither the Tenth Amendment nor the Guarantee Clause
Constitute an Express Waiver
The court in Agua Caliente also relied on the rights guaranteed
to states by the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause of the
Constitution in concluding that tribes are not immune from suit
brought under the PRA.143 While the Tenth Amendment reserves to
a state the power to regulate its legislative processes,144 and the
Guarantee Clause grants to every state the right to a republican form
of government,145 neither, as the court correctly noted in Santa
Rosa, serves as an explicit waiver of tribal immunity from suit.
The FPPC argued, and the Agua Caliente court agreed, that
“[w]ere the Tribe immune under federal law from judicial relief for
violations of the PRA requirements, the State’s exercise of its

140. See supra Part II.B.
141. Santa Rosa Cmty., No. 02AS04544, slip op. at 12; see also Three Affiliated Tribes of
Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, Inc., 476 U.S. 877, 893 (1986) (“The perceived
inequity of permitting the Tribe to recover from a non-Indian for civil wrongs in instances
where a non-Indian allegedly may not recover against the Tribe simply must be accepted in
view of the overriding federal and tribal interests . . . , much in the same way that the perceived
inequity of permitting the United States or [a state] to sue in cases where they could not be
sued as defendants because of their sovereign immunity also must be accepted.”).
142. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998).
143. Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, No.
02AS04545, 2003 WL 733094, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2003), aff’d, Agua Caliente
Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679 (Ct. App. 2004), available
at 2004 WL 389462.
144. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
145. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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reserved power to regulate and preserve the integrity of its electoral
. . . processes would be seriously compromised.”146 Indeed, were
immunity available to tribes for violating state campaign disclosure
laws, states would lose the right to control completely their electoral
processes. If such were the case, tribes would be allowed to make
campaign contributions as they saw fit without having to report such
contributions. Under the Supreme Court’s Buckley analysis, failure to
make tribes comply with these disclosure requirements would
potentially interfere with a state’s interest to inform its voters and
ensure the integrity of its electoral processes.147
But while an inability to compel compliance with state campaign
disclosure requirements might interfere with a state’s compelling
interest, that interference does not remove a tribe’s immunity under
the Supreme Court’s requirement that removal of immunity must be
explicit.148 No court has identified the Tenth Amendment or the
Guarantee Clause as an explicit waiver of tribal immunity. Tribal
immunity from suit has its roots in the Constitution, which grants to
Congress “plenary power to control and define the sovereign
activities and interests of Indian tribes.”149 Congress has exercised
this plenary power to grant to tribes a general immunity from suits
by states. Consequently, “[s]tates have jurisdiction over tribal
activities only as permitted by federal law even when tribal activities
affect state sovereign powers, rights, and interest.”150 While this
immunity may conflict with powers vested in states by the Tenth
Amendment and the Guarantee Clause, “the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution permits Congress to legislate even in
areas traditionally regulated by the States as long as it is acting within
the powers granted it under the Constitution.”151 Consequently,
some of the powers granted to the states by the Constitution may be
146. Agua Caliente, 2003 WL 733094, at *5, *7.
147. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
148. For an example of explicit waiver of tribal immunity by Congress, see Indian Tribal
Economic Development and Contracts Encouragement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-79
(2000), and Tribal Tort Claims and Risk Management Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 105-277
(2000).
149. See Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Santa Rosa Cmty., No. 02AS04544, slip op.
at 10 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2003), http://www.fppc.ca.gov/pdf/Santa%20Rosa%20
Quash%20Ruling.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2004) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
150. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877
(1986), and California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)).
151. Id. at 11 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)).
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diminished by congressional action. It is clear from the Court’s
recent recognition of tribal immunity that it does not see the Tenth
Amendment as providing explicit waiver of tribal immunity in suits
between tribes and states.152
As a result, neither the Tenth Amendment nor the Guarantee
Clause serves as an exception to the general requirements of tribal
immunity from suit. Instead, an acknowledgement of tribal
immunity in cases brought under the PRA does not “impermissibly
intrude upon the States’ reserved powers under the Tenth
Amendment and Guaranty [sic] Clause.”153 While neither includes an
explicit exception for tribal immunity from a state’s reserved powers,
this silence cannot serve as “congressional acknowledgment of the
States’ right to bring such suits against the tribes in the exercise of
the States’ powers under the Tenth Amendment and the Guaranty
[sic] Clause of the United States Constitution.”154 Because of the
time and resources which would be required for Congress to
explicitly identify every situation in which tribal immunity is
applicable, such a requirement for determining whether tribal
immunity is available would be unreasonable. Because of these
congressional limitations, the Supreme Court’s requirement that
immunity be abrogated only upon express waiver is a more
appropriate standard for determining when states may bring suit
against tribes.
C. Immunity Does Not Prevent the Disclosure of Tribal Contributions
While removal of tribal immunity is unfounded when the FPPC
is trying to enforce disclosure requirements against Indian tribes,
such removal does not destroy the purpose of the Act, which is to
provide California voters with a clear picture of a candidate’s
financial supporters.155
In addition to requiring that donor committees report
contributions made to political candidates, the Act also requires that
candidates or other recipients of tribal contributions report the
contribution.156 Under section 84211 of the Act, candidates and

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See generally Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998).
Santa Rosa Cmty., No. 02AS04544, slip op. at 10.
Id.
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 81001(b) (2003).
Id. § 84211.
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others who receive contributions must report “[t]he total amount of
contributions received during the period covered by the campaign
statement and the total cumulative amount of contributions
received.”157 In addition to disclosing the amounts of any
contribution, the Act requires that the candidate disclose the donor’s
name, address, and occupation.158 The Act makes no explicit
exception for donations by Indian tribes.159
Thus, while the tribe is immune from prosecution to enforce the
requirements of the Political Reform Act, disclosure of the extent of
tribal influence on political candidates and processes is made
available through mandatory disclosure requirements enforceable
against candidates. The dual reporting requirements imposed upon
both donor and donee achieve the same result, though in a different
manner, as if the tribe were not immune from suit and were
responsible for complying with the state’s reporting requirements.160
If the purpose of the PRA is to ensure that voters are not misled
in the election process by the hidden interests of a candidate or the
invisible supporters of legislation, the source of the disclosure,
157. Id. § 84211(a).
158. Id. § 84211(f).
159. While the Act includes no specific requirement that tribes disclose the recipient(s) of
their donations and while acts by the State to enforce the disclosure requirements would, as
this Comment suggests, violate the notions of tribal immunity, the Agua Caliente Tribe has
“extended [a] courtes[y] to the State of California and disclosed the recipients of campaign
donations
for
the
year
2002.”
FPPC
&
Lobbyist
Reports,
at
http://www.aguacaliente.org/reports.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2004). These disclosures were
made in compliance with the Act’s requirements and were made on the State’s reporting
forms. These disclosures are available on the Tribe’s website. See id.
160. This result assumes, of course, that candidates will be truthful in their disclosures.
The potential for candidate dishonesty in reporting campaign contributions increases when
supporters are not required to report their contributions. One purpose of the dual reporting
system is to remove enticements for candidate dishonesty. But as the potential for dishonesty
increases, the likelihood of such dishonesty does not also necessarily increase. In deciding
whether to be truthful in their reporting of campaign contributions, candidates must weigh
any added benefits received from failing to disclose campaign contributors against the potential
costs associated with a future revelation of their dishonesty. Because of the potentially high
costs associated with a candidate who is thought to have deceived voters, it is likely that this
cost-benefit analysis will result in candidates providing full disclosure of their campaign
supporters.
Further, while a removal of the requirement that supporters report their campaign
donations may increase the likelihood of collusion between candidates and supporters, it
should be noted that the dual reporting system allows for collusion between parties as well.
Candidates and supporters could decide to mutually ignore the reporting requirements under
the dual reporting system as they can when only the candidate is required to report
contributions.
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whether tribe or candidate, is irrelevant. That the tribes themselves
are not required to provide disclosures does not destroy these
purposes; the dual disclosure requirements provide that all financial
contributors to a candidate’s campaign are disclosed by the
candidate.161
With respect to tribal contributions, the real effect of tribal
immunity from enforcement of the Political Reform Act is that a
snapshot of all tribal contributions will only be available if the tribe
chooses to voluntarily comply with the state disclosure requirements.
Without this snapshot, voters will be required to look at individual
disclosure requirements to determine which candidates and which
causes individual tribes support. But because the information is
available, albeit in a less manageable form through candidate
disclosures, the purposes of the Act are still satisfied.
V. CONCLUSION
Protecting a state’s interests in its own political processes by
requiring individuals and organizations who donate to political
candidates or causes to disclose their donations (rightfully) has been
held to be an important governmental interest. The right to regulate
these processes is entrusted to the states through the Constitution.
This authority to regulate may serve as a limit to traditional notions
of tribal sovereignty that the Supreme Court has recognized as
inhering in Indian tribes.
But while states may have compelling interests in protecting their
political processes, and while those interests may preempt tribal
sovereignty and allow states to regulate tribal contributions, those
interests do not allow states to enforce the regulations in state court.
The doctrine of tribal immunity provides Indian tribes with a general
shield against prosecution in state or federal court. This immunity is
removed only when it is expressly waived either by Congress or the
tribes. As the court in Santa Rosa correctly held, neither a state’s
compelling interests in protecting its political processes nor the
Tenth Amendment nor the Guarantee Clause serve as an express
waiver of tribal immunity for cases brought under the PRA.162
The policies of the Act, however, are not frustrated by
recognizing tribal immunity. Because the state requires recipients of
161. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84211(a)(2003).
162. See supra Part III.B.
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campaign contributions to disclose the names of donors and the
amounts of any donations made, any influence that tribes may
attempt to exert on California’s political processes will be
disclosed.163 Thus a tribe’s interests in avoiding suit and the state’s
interest in protecting its processes are both protected by recognizing
tribal immunity under the Political Reform Act.
Cameron A. Reese

163. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84211(a).
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